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1. Introduction  
The standard open-economy money demand model uses a two-country portfolio balance 
model (e.g., Leventakis 1993). This macro-model does not include microeconomic 
foundations and, thus, is subject to the Lucas’s (1976) critique.1 Because of its static nature, 
the estimated money demand may appear unstable for modified monetary policy strategies.  
This paper investigates and compares currency substitution between the currencies of 
CEE countries and the euro. As CEE countries move toward more financial integration with the 
European Union, standard theory suggests that CEE households should use an increasing share 
of euro money relative to their own domestic money. Two policy implications emerge from 
our study. The monetary authorities in the CEE countries should consider not only the 
opportunity cost of holding money, but also the effect of the exchange rate, which occurs 
even absent strong currency substitution. The CEE countries need the political will to join the 
euro zone, even though efforts must continue toward higher monetary integration. 
The empirical studies of the money demand typically do not provide a micro-founded 
theoretical model to justify the specification of their empirical money demand functions.2 In 
addition, these models test for currency substitution through money demand's sensitivity to 
the exchange rate. Such a framework imposes important limitations, since one cannot 
examine one phenomenon (currency substitution) independently of the other (exchange rate 
sensitivity). Moreover, these models examine open-economy money demand sensitivity 
without differentiating between currency substitution and currency complementarity. 
We contribute to the existing literature in two ways. First, we develop a micro-founded 
model that describes a mechanism through which the exchange rate affects money demand, 
                                                          
1 According to Hueng (1998), Dreger et al. (2007) and Hsieh and Hsing (2009), the overall effect of the 
exchange rate on the domestic money demand is not straightforward. Moreover, it is not clear whether the level 
or the (expected) exchange rate variation should enter the money demand equation. In addition, different 
measures of variables that enter the money demand equation appear in empirical studies without explicit 
theoretical support (Hueng, 2000). 
2 Chen (1973), Miles (1978), Bordo and Choudri (1982) and Hueng (1998, 2000) are exceptions. 
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even absent currency substitution. That is, money demand responds to exchange rate 
fluctuations, even after removing currency substitution, because the exchange rate affects the 
liquidity service associated with foreign money holding. Indeed, our model measures 
currency substitution intensity without explicitly considering the exchange rate. In addition, 
the model captures both currency substitution and currency complementarity hypotheses, 
which enables the assessment of the currency substitution intensity.3 Further, to capture 
recent economic circumstances, where interest rates went negative, we consider an additional 
opportunity cost of holding money (domestic or foreign), which keeps the overall opportunity 
cost positive, even where the interest rate itself becomes negative. 
Our micro-founded model, which integrates the liquidity production function and a 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) consumption function, produces a money demand 
function close to Miles (1978), who, however, does not consider the consumption choice. 
Thus, we demonstrate that the Bordo-Choudri (1982) criticism of Miles’s (1978) money 
demand function is not relevant, since the function does not reflect the omission of 
consumption or income. 
Second, we parameterize our model to test the long-run sensitivity of an open-economy 
money demand. In particular, our model fits the CEE case, where the euro offers liquidity 
services to domestic agents.4 After their transition from a centralized to a market-based 
economic system, the CEE countries joined the European Union (EU). Several CEE countries 
already belong to the euro area, while others continue the integration process. Investigating 
money demand in euro area candidate countries offers information about their degree of 
                                                          
3 Currency substitution is defined as “the tendency of residents to replace domestic money with foreign 
currencies in response to changes in their relative rate of return” (Filosa, 1995). Currency complementarity 
means that agents hold domestic and foreign money in fixed proportions, as no substitutability exists between 
them, and implies that the relative demands for domestic and foreign money do not depend on difference 
between the domestic and foreign interest rates.   
4 In CEE countries, the agents hold foreign money not only for foreign goods consumption, but also for 
domestic goods consumption. Thus, even if the preference for foreign money decreases continuously, a part of 
real estate or cars transactions are still performed using foreign currencies, especially the euro. 
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monetary integration and about the liquidity services provided by the domestic currency 
compared to the euro.   
Dreger et al. (2007), Hsieh and Hsing (2009), and Fidrmuc (2009) investigate money 
demand in CEE countries. These empirical analyses, however, do not provide a theoretical 
framework. Therefore, we test the long-run relationship between money demand and its 
explanatory variables in a micro-founded model that generates two cointegrating equations. 
The first equation captures the sensitivity of real money demand for foreign currency to the 
opportunity cost spread of holding the money. The second equation captures the long-run 
relationship between real money demand for domestic currency and the opportunity cost of 
holding the domestic currency, the opportunity cost spread, and a scale variable. 
We use Hansen’s (1992) instability test to check for long-run relationships and the 
Dynamic OLS (DOLS) and the Fully-Modified OLS (FMOLS) methods to estimate the 
cointegrating relationships. We employ monthly data from 1999:M1 to 2015:M11 on four 
CEE countries -- Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania -- that use a floating 
exchange rate mechanism.5 Our model proves, nevertheless, compatible with any exchange 
rate regime. Also, investigating the effect of currency substitution requires flexibility, but not 
necessarily a free-floating mechanism (e.g., Fidrmuc, 2009).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the models of 
money demand in an open economy. Section 3 presents our micro-founded money demand 
model. Section 4 parameterizes the model and identifies the cointegrating equations. Section 
5 reports our empirical investigation for the CEE countries. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                          
5 Croatia also has in place a managed floating exchange rate regime. However, until 2006, an exchange rate 
targeting regime was used. In addition, there are no data available for the monetary aggregate M2 for Croatia. 
Therefore, in order to have a consistent comparison of results for the CEE countries, we have decided to exclude 
Croatia from our sample.   
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2. The open-economy money demand models 
Two different strands of literature characterize open-economy money demand models. The 
first strand considers micro-founded money demand models (e.g., Miles 1978, Bordo and 
Choudri 1982, and Hueng 1998, 2000). The second bulk of the literature empirically tests 
various money demand functions without considering the microeconomic foundations of their 
specifications (e.g., see early contributions of Cuddington 1983, and Leventakis 1993). 
Dreger et al. (2007), Hsieh and Hsing (2009), and Fidrmuc (2009) specifically examine 
money demand in CEE countries.   
Miles (1978) uses Chetty’s (1969) CES liquidity production function to derive the 
demand for domestic money relative to foreign money.6 Bordo and Choudri (1982), however, 
argue that Miles (1978) misspecified his model, since he omitted income. In effect, Miles’s 
portfolio choice model does not depend on the consumption-saving decision. Therefore, 
money demand does not depend on income. The money demand derives from the 
maximization of monetary service flows subject to an asset constraint. As a consequence, the 
ratio of domestic to foreign money demand depends only on the opportunity costs (i.e., 
domestic and foreign interest rates). 
Bordo and Choudri (1982) derive money demand from a money-in-the-utility-function 
model. Their simplified model, however, is static, assuming that agents spend their entire 
income each period and that perfect interest rate arbitrage exists, thus, eliminating the effect 
of the exchange rate.  
Hueng (1998, 2000) constructs cash-in-advance and shopping-time models to motivate 
money demand in an open economy. The cash-in-advance model in a two-country world, first 
studied by Stockman (1980), Lucas (1982) and Guidotti (1989), hinges on the assumption 
that agents purchase domestic and foreign goods with domestic and foreign currencies, 
                                                          
6 Chen (1973) is a special case of Miles (1978), assuming a Cobb-Douglas demand function, which constrains 
the elasticity of substitution to equal one. 
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respectively. The shopping-time model assumes that the time spent in purchasing domestic 
(foreign) consumption goods depends on the holdings of domestic (foreign) money. Thus, in 
the cash-in-advance and shopping-time models of Hueng (1998, 2000), foreign (domestic) 
money provides liquidity service only for foreign (domestic) good consumption. This critical 
assumption makes Hueng’s (1998, 2000) models limited interest in economies where agents 
hold foreign money not only to purchase foreign goods, but also to purchase domestic goods. 
In addition, in some countries (i.e., the CEE countries), the agents can partially (or even 
totally) substitute an international money for their domestic money to purchase goods, 
regardless of the goods' origin.7  
The second group of papers empirically examines whether currency substitution plays 
an important role in the demands for domestic and foreign money. Leventakis’s (1993) two-
country portfolio balance model shows that a change in the expected exchange rate affects the 
demand for domestic money by inducing its substitution with foreign money, which is the 
(direct) currency substitution effect, and with foreign bonds, which is the capital mobility 
effect.8 If the exchange rate elasticity is high (i.e., if money demand is very sensitive to the 
exchange rate), this may indicate that currency substitution plays an important role in money 
demand.9 If agents can switch between foreign and domestic money, then this may affect 
their money holdings.  
Starting from this theoretical assumption, Dreger et al. (2007), Hsieh and Hsing (2009), 
and Fidrmuc (2009) examine the money demand in the CEE countries. Dreger et al. (2007) 
                                                          
7 In our model, we make no distinction between foreign and domestic consumption goods. The representative 
agent’s utility depends on the agent's entire consumption bundle, which mixes foreign and domestic goods, and 
on domestic and foreign money that produce liquidity services. The agent can invest in a portfolio composed of 
domestic and foreign money and bonds. By maximizing the (inter-temporal) utility function, we derive the 
money demand. 
8 The capital mobility effect is one of the two parts of the indirect currency substitution defined by McKinnon 
(1982). The second part is the substitution of domestic money with domestic bonds (under the assumption that 
uncovered interest parity holds, and a variation of the expected exchange rate induces a variation of the 
domestic interest rate). 
9 In Leventakis’s (1993) general model, it is impossible to isolate the separate effects of currency substitution 
and capital mobility on the money demand. But if foreigners do not hold domestic currency assets, as for 
example in Cuddington (1983), it becomes possible to separate their effects. 
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study money demand in the new EU member states from 1995 to 2004. A well-behaved long-
run money demand relationship exists only if the exchange rate appears as part of the 
opportunity cost. In the long-run cointegrating vector, the output elasticity exceeds unity. 
Over the entire sample, the exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar proves significant and a 
more appropriate variable in money demand than the euro exchange rate. 
Fidrmuc (2009) investigates the money demand with monthly data between 1994 and 
2003 in six CEE countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia), and finds that the money demand depends significantly on the euro interest rate 
and on the exchange rate against the euro, which indicates possible instability of the money 
demand in these countries. The exchange rate elasticity, however, is low, which is, according 
to Fidrmuc, a good precondition for the eventual adoption of the euro by the CEE countries.10 
The euro area interest rates significantly shaped money demand in the CEE countries, 
indicating that capital mobility plays an important role in this region. The coefficient 
estimated for the euro area interest rate exceeds by a large amount the coefficients of 
domestic rates. Hsieh and Hsing (2009) find that the demand for M2 in Hungary positively 
associates with the nominal effective exchange rate and negatively associates with the deposit 
rate, the euro area interest rate, and the expected inflation rate from 1995-2005. They find an 
output elasticity near to unity, while Fidrmuc (2009) finds lower output elasticity, and a euro 
area interest rate coefficient higher than the domestic rate coefficient. 
Elbourne and de Haan (2006) and Fidrmuc (2009) argue that a stable money demand 
and a transmission mechanism similar to that in the euro area will create good pre-conditions 
for the eventual introduction of the euro by new EU member states. Filosa (1995) and Dreger 
et al. (2007) also conclude that a stable money demand provides an important condition for 
using monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy. Thus, these authors see that 
                                                          
10 He also finds that the parameters of money demand in CEE countries closely approximates those in developed 
countries, which gives a good pre-condition for euro adoption. 
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currency substitution indicates money demand instability. As such, a low exchange rate 
elasticity would, thus, provide a good pre-condition for the eventual adoption of the euro in 
the CEE countries. 
On the contrary, this point of view is problematic. In fact, currency substitution results 
from monetary integration. Miles (1978), McKinnon (1982), Bordo and Choudri (1982), 
Leventakis (1993) and Hueng (1998) remind us that if people’s money holdings change with 
foreign monetary developments, such as the foreign interest rate and the exchange rate, then 
the isolation mechanism of the floating exchange rate system will not work, thus providing 
the policymaker lower control from stabilization policies. Currency substitution does reduce 
the stability of the money demand in each country, but this does not mean that the global 
money demand is less stable. In fact, while defining meaningful monetary aggregates, 
McKinnon (1982) suggests that currency substitution makes an appropriately defined global 
(monetary union) money supply rather than national money supplies more relevant for 
studying global (union) inflation. Thus, when currency substitution occurs, it then becomes 
more appropriate to conduct a global (union) monetary policy rather than a national monetary 
policy. From this point of view, currency substitution between CEE currencies and the euro 
gives a signal of monetary integration between the two areas and a good pre-condition for the 
eventual adoption of the euro by the CEE countries. 
Our research relies on both strands of literature described above. First, we propose a 
micro-founded money demand model, which separates the currency substitution effect from 
the money demand sensitivity to exchange rates. Second, we parameterize the model and we 
empirically investigate the long-run money demand with an application to four CEE 
countries. 
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3. The micro-founded open economy money demand model 
The domestic agent living in an outlying country (i.e., CEE country) orders his preferences 
according to the lifetime utility function:  
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where 
tX  is monetary consumption spending measured in terms of domestic money, tP  is the 
price index, 
tM  is domestic money holding, and 
*
tM  is foreign money holding. If one unit of 
foreign money equals 
tS  units of domestic money, then 
*
ttMS  equals the domestic money 
value of the domestic agent’s foreign money holding. The expectations operator .Et  is 
conditional on the information available at time t.  
The agent faces the following budget constraint:  
        *ttt*ttttt*t* 1ttt1t* 1tt1t BSBMSMXZi1BSi1B1MS1M   ,  
where 
tB  is the monetary value (in terms of domestic money) of domestic bond holding, and 
*
tB  is the monetary value (in terms of foreign money) of foreign bond holding, which is an 
imperfect substitute for the domestic bonds because of exchange rate risk; 
tZ  is the lump-
sum monetary transfer to the agent from the government; and
1ti   and 
*
1ti   are the nominal 
domestic and foreign interest rates. As bonds are nominally risk-free, 
1ti   and 
*
1ti   are known 
at time t.  
The parameter   represents the cost the agent faces for holding money. We model this 
cost as a proportional cost to simplify the analysis. It stands for the charges related to the use 
of a bank account, the cost of a bank card, the renting of a bank safe deposit box, and the cost 
of cash theft or loss. In standard money demand models, the proportional cost is neglected 
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(i.e., 0 ); hence, the interest rate cannot be negative. Assuming a non-zero   addresses in 
a simple way negative interest rates (a similar approach is adopted by Benati et al., 2016). 
We calculate real consumption spending from the budget constraint as follows:  
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The agent maximizes equation (1) with respect to 
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equation (2). Let HU  denote the partial derivative of U with respect to H. The first-order 
conditions are as follows: 
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Equations (4), (5), and (6) describe the direct and indirect currency substitution. First, 
consider equation (4). This equation generates the optimal foreign money holding. It assumes 
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that direct currency substitution exists. On the contrary, imagine that the agent cannot 
substitute foreign and domestic currencies. Then the agent cannot choose his level of foreign 
money holding, which is fixed: 
t
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MS  , or in a more general way, 
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  , where *tem  is exogenous. In any case, if no currency substitution 
exists, the agent cannot decide the level of 
t
*
tt
P
MS
 and he cannot optimize his utility function 
with respect to it. Therefore, equation (4) does not hold if currency substitution does not 
exist. Equation (4) then is a consequence of currency substitution.11 
Next, consider equation (6). This equation produces the optimal foreign bond holding. 
It assumes capital mobility. If international capital flows are restricted, then the agent cannot 
choose his foreign bond holding, which is fixed in the extreme case: 
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  , where *teb  is exogenous. If capital mobility does 
not exist, then the agent cannot determine 
t
*
tt
P
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 and equation (6) does not hold. Equation (6) 
then is a consequence of capital mobility. 
Finally, consider equation (5). This equation makes the optimal domestic bond holding. 
Indirect currency substitution assumes that the agent can freely choose domestic bond holding. 
If the agent cannot determine 
t
t
P
B
, then equation (5) does not hold. 
                                                          
11 The ownership of foreign money by residents is not proof of (direct) currency substitution. Rather, the 
responsiveness of foreign money demand to the exchange rate or to the foreign interest rate provides clear 
evidence of currency substitution. 
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Now, suppose the absence of currency substitution, direct or indirect, which 
corresponds to the hypothesis of exogeneity of 
t
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, and equations (4), (5), 
and (6) do not hold. The agent only determines the optimal domestic money holding, hinging 
on equation (3), the only equation that holds. Equation (3) shows a relationship between the 
current and one-period ahead marginal utility of consumption, foreign and domestic real cash 
balances, and the inflation rate. As the various marginal utilities depend on 
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. For this somewhat complex formulation of the open-
economy money demand, we observe that the one-period ahead exchange rate 
1tS   enters the 
money demand function. So, even after removing any possibility of currency substitution, the 
money demand depends on the exchange rate, a result that contrasts with the whole literature 
devoted to currency substitution.  
The intuition behind this result is simple. In effect, the variation of the exchange rate 
influences the liquidity services provided by foreign money holding. Even if the agent will 
not replace domestic money with foreign money (or with domestic or foreign bonds) in 
response to changes in their relative rate of return, the agent can switch between consumption 
and domestic money holding to respond to liquidity shocks caused by the exchange rate 
change.  
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Therefore, the agent responds to the exchange rate change by modifying domestic 
money holding. Consequently, in any case, we conclude that a non-zero exchange rate 
elasticity results from direct or indirect currency substitution.12 
Thus, if we remove any possibility of currency substitution, equation (3) shows that the 
domestic money demand depends on the exchange rate and the inflation rate. The money 
demand, however, does not depend on the domestic and foreign interest rates. If we make the 
assumption, which seems realistic, that the agent controls domestic bond holdings, then 
equation (5) holds too. Multiplying equation (3) by    1)i1( 1t and subtracting equation 
(5) gives: 
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No more role exists for risky variables in equation (7), in particular reference to the 
inflation rate or the exchange rate. Equation (7) shows that domestic money demand depends 
on 
t
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,
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, and the domestic interest rate 
1ti  .  
We can write the money demand function in many ways. We can use equation (3) to 
express money demand as a complex function involving the exchange rate and the inflation 
rate, or we can use a mix of equations (3) and (5) express money demand in a way that 
excludes these two variables. If we add the hypothesis that the agent controls foreign bond 
holdings, which assumes capital mobility, equation (6) also holds. Multiply equation (6) by 
1ti  and then subtracting equation (7) gives: 
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12 In fact, the consumption – money substitution effect that we describe is possibly more important than the 
currency substitution effect, depending on the value of the liquidity elasticity defined hereafter. 
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This equation leads to a complex, intractable formulation of the domestic money 
demand depending on all variables considered in the model, the exchange rate, the inflation 
rate, and the foreign and domestic interest rates. 
Finally, we add the assumption of direct currency substitution, which means that 
equation (4) holds. Then multiplying equation (4) by      1i1 * 1t and subtracting equation 
(6) gives: 
    0i1UiU * 1t
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MS
*
1t
P
X
t
*
tt
t
t
  . (8) 
Both equations (7) and (8) depend on known (non-random) terms that express the 
domestic money demand as a function of domestic and foreign interest rates (but independent 
of the exchange rate and the inflation rate). 
To conclude, a non-zero exchange rate elasticity does not prove that currency 
substitution exists. Indeed, a consumption–money substitution effect also influences the 
money demand and, thus, the sensitivity of money demand to international variables should 
not depend solely on currency substitution. And even if currency substitution exists, we can 
still express the money demand as a function independent of the exchange rate.  
Finally, we cannot test the assumption of currency substitution in a model that depends 
crucially on this hypothesis. If equations (3) to (6) hold, then we assume indirect and direct 
currency substitution, which is a core hypothesis of the model and which we cannot test. 
Fortunately, this assumption is not as strict as it seems, as the micro-founded model permits a 
flexible degree of substitution, which could be higher or lower, consistent with a high degree 
of currency substitution or with currency complementarity. We investigate the degree of 
currency substitution between the euro and the currencies of the CEE countries and estimate 
the intensity of the parameters that explain the sensitivity of money demand to international 
economic variables. 
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4. A parameterization of the utility function 
Following Miles (1978), we parameterize our model by specifying that the domestic and 
foreign currency enter a CES liquidity production function 
tt PL , and that the produced 
liquidity and real consumption also enter a CES function: 
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where )1/(1    is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and liquidity, and 
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with 



1
, (10) 
where )1/(1   is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign money in 
the liquidity production function. 
In the case of a zero elasticity of substitution     , the CES function becomes the 
Leontief function, which indicates that domestic and foreign money (or consumption and 
liquidity) are perfect complements. In the particular case of a unitary elasticity of 
substitution, the CES function becomes a Cobb-Douglas function. 
When the elasticity of substitution      increases, it is easier to replace one currency 
with another (or to replace consumption with liquidity). In the extreme perfect substitution 
case, the elasticity of substitution goes to infinity. A value of 1   1 indicates 
substitutability between domestic and foreign moneys (between consumption and liquidity), 
while a value 1  (ζ<1) indicates complementarity between them. If we confirm the 
assumption of CEE countries’ monetary integration with the euro area, then these currencies 
must be highly substitutable with the euro. Therefore, we must pay particular attention to the 
  (ζ) estimation. 
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whose inputs are domestic and foreign money holdings, and where   is the share parameter. 
The condition  > 0.5 ( < 0.5) means that the domestic money is more (less) liquid than the 
euro in the eyes of the CEE countries’ representative agent. The CES liquidity production 
function and the real consumption are next combined according to a CES utility function13 
where   is the share parameter. We restrict the parameters of the utility and liquidity 
production functions so that 10,10  , 0 and 0 . 
Calculating the partial derivatives 
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U , and inserting them 
successively into equations (7) and (8) gives:  
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and 
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As the left-hand terms of equations (11) and (12) are the same, equations (11) and 12 
leads to:   
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13 The generalized utility function 

1U
1
1  leads to the same money demand function as the CES U function, 
which does not depend on the risk aversion parameter  . Therefore, we ignore risk aversion, as it does not 
affect the money demand equation. 
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  as the opportunity costs of holding domestic 
and foreign moneys. If 0 , then these opportunity costs equal the discounted interest 
rates.14  
We rewrite equation (13) in natural logarithms as follows: 
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Equation (14) is similar to the relationship between domestic and foreign money 
demand derived by Miles (1978), except that we replace the terms 
1ti1   and 
*
1ti1   in Miles 
(1978) with 
1toc   and 
*
1toc  . By integrating the liquidity production function and the 
consumption in a CES function, we demonstrate that the Bordo-Choudri (1982) criticism of 
Miles’s (1978) money demand equation is not relevant, as the equation does not reflect the 
omission of consumption or income. When we analyze domestic money demand compared to 
foreign money demand, we do not need to add a scale variable such as consumption or 
income. We only need the share parameter and the elasticity of substitution to explain the 
shift in domestic money demand relative to foreign money demand. 
If  *ttt MSMln  and  * 1t1t oclnocln    are I(1), then equation (14) describes a 
cointegrating relationship.15 In the long run, equation (14) holds exactly, and so it appears as 
a long-run money demand equation. In the short run, however, because adjustment takes 
time, a temporary disequilibrium 
t  exists such that the relationship is: 
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14 The empirical money demand literature depicts the interest rate as the opportunity cost of money holding, 
which assumes that 0 , and uses it as a regressor in the money demand equation. But, as the interest rate is 
perceived one period later, we must discount it to the present, and the discounted interest rate enters the money 
demand regression. 
15 Standard unit-root tests and panel unit-root tests confirm that the variables involved in equation (17) are I(1) 
processes (see Dreger et al. 2007; Fidrmuc, 2009; Hsieh and Hsing, 2009). 
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where the elements 
0  and 1  of the cointegrating vector related to the structural parameters 
by    1ln0  and 1 . 
The relative money demand function in equation (15) is not the only result of the 
model. Our model also delivers a money demand equation dependent on a scale variable 
(consumption or income), more consistent with the standard empirical money demand 
equations estimated in the literature. 
Returning to equation (11) expressed as: 
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and insert equation (13) into equation (16) to get: 
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Consider that the country in question is an outlying country, and its currency offers no 
liquidity services to foreign agents. In this case, we assume that the money of the foreign 
country (i.e., the euro) is an international money that offers liquidity services to the agent of 
the outlying country, but not the reverse. The foreign agent does not demand money from the 
outlying country and the total demand for money of this country simply equals 
tt PM .  
Taking the logarithm of equation (17) gives: 
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We observe that the money demand equation (18) conforms to the standard result of a 
unitary output elasticity. The model is a somewhat complex nonlinear equation and we decide 
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to restrict our analysis to a simplified linearized version similar to those in empirical money 
studies.16 
If we assume that * 1t1t oclnocln    is approximately a constant s , which we consider as 
a long-run spread, then the Taylor expansion yields: 
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If   * 1t1t1ttt oclnocln,ocln,PMln   , and  tt PXln  are I(1), then equation (19) 
describes a second cointegrating relationship. In the long run, this money demand equation 
holds exactly, but in the short run, the money depends also on a stationary disequilibrium 
t : 
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where the elements of the cointegrating vector relate to the structural parameters by  
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The parameter 1  measures the interest rate elasticity and the sign of the parameter 2  
depends on the difference between the two elasticities of substitution   and  . 
The money demand equations (15) and (20) follow in the line of Meltzer (1963), or fit 
the category of Baumol-Tobin models (i.e., inventory-theoretic models, Baumol 1952 and 
Tobin 1956), which consider, as explanatory variables, the log of opportunity cost, and not 
the opportunity cost itself, as in Cagan’s (1956) approach. 
                                                          
16 Hueng (2000) made the same choice when confronted with a nonlinear money demand function. 
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Cagan’s (1956) semi-log form is the most commonly used specification for empirical 
analysis of money demand, where the opportunity cost generally becomes the interest rate. 
The existence of low, or even negative, interest rates makes it difficult or impossible to use a 
log-log money demand specification when we 0 . But, for a high enough value of ϕ, or for 
much higher interest rates, the log-log money demand specification offers an interesting 
alternative.17 
5. An application to the CEE countries 
W can apply the model described in the previous sections to the CEE countries, where an 
international currency (the euro) offers liquidity services to domestic agents. In the CEE 
countries, the ratio of foreign currency deposits to total deposits is high, and most foreign 
currency deposits are euros.  
We use monthly statistics for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania, to 
test the two long-run money demand equations -- equations (15) and (20) -- from 1999M1 to 
2015M11. The data come from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, the 
Eurostat database, the OECD database, and statistics provided by the national central banks.  
In equation (15), the ratio of domestic to foreign currency deposits proxies for the 
money demand in our model, as the structure of money in circulation (cash) is unknown. For 
equation (20), we use M2 to compute real money demand, as researchers commonly use 
broad money to estimate money demand in the CEE countries. For robustness purpose, in 
equation (20) we also employ M1 in equation (20) to measure real money demand. We use 
the money market rate, the consumer price index, and household consumption expenditure.18 
A complete data description appears in the Appendix. 
                                                          
17 Lucas (2000) compares the two types of money demand and expresses a preference for the log-log form (for 
additional arguments for the log-log specification see, also, Benati et al, 2016 and Miller, Martins, and Gupta 
forthcoming). In contrast, Ireland (2009) argues for the semi-log form. The debate on the best choice of the form 
for the money demand equation still continues. 
18 Because our model relies on monetary consumption spending, we have retained household consumption 
expenditure for the scale variable in equation (20). This variable is available on a quarterly basis only, and we 
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For the opportunity cost ϕ, we do not distinguish between money in circulation and 
deposits. Thus, the proportional cost is identical for all money substitutes. In addition, we 
consider that the value of ϕ is sufficiently small (see previous studies). In this context, we set 
for monthly data a value of 0.00082953 (equivalent to 1% on an annual basis), which 
corresponds to a loss rate or negative return of 1% for narrow money19 advanced by Lucas 
and Nicolini (2015) and Benati et al. (2016). As explained by Benati et al. (2016), a non-zero 
(strictly positive) value for ϕ is a necessary assumption when considering a log-log money 
demand, especially if the model is applied to data containing periods of nearly zero interest 
rates.  
We estimate the cointegration equations (15) and (20) by the DOLS method of 
Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993) and by the FMOLS method of Phillips and 
Hansen (1990). Both procedures produce asymptotically unbiased estimators even in the 
absence of strong exogeneity of the regressors. 
Both methods are also consistent with the triangular representation of Phillips (1988, 
1991) of cointegrated I(1) processes. This representation is valid for any cointegrating rank, 
but we assume that a cointegrating rank of 2. Consider a n-vector  'YyyY ' t3t2t1t  , where 
t1y  and t2y  are one-dimensional I(1) processes and t3Y  is a (n-2)-dimensional I(1) process. 
Assume that 
tY  is cointegrated with rank 2. The triangular representation is an n-equations 
system consisting of two cointegrating regressions: 





t2t3
'
22t2
t1t3
'
11t1
zYay
zYay
 , (21) 
and a (n-2)-dimensional I(1) process: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
use a cubic spline function to generate the monthly frequency. In line with previous empirical estimations, 
however, we also use the industrial production index on a monthly basis for the scale variable. Using the Census 
X13, we seasonally adjusted both variables. 
19 For cash, it is likely that the value of ϕ increases to 2%. This is the estimate by Alvarez and Lippi (2009) of 
the probability of cash theft in Italy, for example. A value of 1%, however, seems a priori more appropriate to 
describe the loss of cash and costs associated with owning a bank account. 
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t33t3 ZY  , (22) 
where 
t3Y  is not cointegrated and  ' t3t2t1 Zzz  is a zero-mean stationary process. 
This triangular representation presents 
t1y  and t2y  as the “dependent” variables, but in 
fact, it does not require that they are the only endogenous variables, as the hypothesis of 
strong exogeneity of the (n-2)-dimensional regressor 
t3Y  is not required. Note that this 
representation assumes that only one “dependent” variable exists in each of the cointegrating 
regressions and that an equation for each “dependent” variable also exists. Equations (15) and 
(20) prove consistent with this triangular representation with  *tttt1 MSMlny  , 
 ttt2 PMlny   and   
'
tt
*
1t1t1tt3 PXlnoclnoclnoclnY   . The DOLS and FMOLS 
estimators of system (21) are asymptotically equivalent to the Johansen’s maximum 
likelihood estimation method (Johansen, 1988), based on the vector error-correction model. 
They deliver standard statistics (e.g., t- and Wald-statistics) that are asymptotically normally 
distributed. 
Before estimating the long-run relationship, however, we want to ensure that our series 
are I(1). Therefore, in the first step, we apply ADF and PP unit root tests, including a constant 
term. Table 1 presents the results and show that our variables are I(1).20 Therefore, we 
proceed with the cointegration analysis for both equations (15) and (20). 
For each equation, we test the existence of a long-run relationship based on Hansen’s 
(1992) instability test, relying on the cL  statistic. The null hypothesis of this cointegration 
test is the presence of cointegration. For the DOLS-type estimations, we choose the number 
of leads and lags using the Akaike information criteria, while for the FMOLS (with Bartlett 
kernel), we use a Newey-West automatic bandwidth rule. We test different hypotheses on the 
parameters based on the Wald test t-statistic. 
                                                          
20 A small exception occurs for the log of the real industrial production in Romania. 
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The results for each equation (15) and (20) appear in Tables 2, 3, and 4. First, looking 
at equation (15), we notice that in almost all the cases the results of the cointegration test 
differ between the DOLS and FMOLS estimations. The cointegration exists for the DOLS 
estimation only. Hungary represents an exception, as the 
cL  statistic shows the existence of a 
long-run relationship for both the DOLS and FMOLS estimations. Now, if we accept the 
hypothesis of cointegration, both methods show that the elasticity of substitution is low, less 
than 1, and positive (except for Poland). In addition, the Wald t-statistic shows that 11  . 
We see that, according to this criterion, the monetary integration of CEE countries with the 
euro area is reduced, as the value of elasticity between the currencies estimated by 1  
indicates currency complementary rather than currency substitution. This affirmation, 
however, is true to a smaller extent for Romania, where a many current transactions use 
euros.21 
The results for our second cointegrating relationship in equation (20) appear in Table 3. 
A first set considers real household consumption as a scale variable, while a second set 
considers real industrial production as a scale variable. 
Several conclusions emerge from these findings. First, the coefficients’ sign and 
significance level reports, in general, a strong correspondence between the DOLS and 
FMOLS estimations. We can validate the cointegration relationship, however, in all cases 
only for the DOLS approach. The FMOLS estimation exhibit more mitigated findings, as we 
reject the null hypothesis of cointegration 3 of the 8 cases. 
Second, the interest elasticity 1ω  shows the expected sign and it is significant, except 
for Poland when consumption is the scale variable. Its low value indicates that consumption 
and liquidity are complements, not substitutes, except for Romania with industrial production 
                                                          
21 According to the National Bank of Romania statistics (monthly bulletins), the ratio of foreign currency to total 
deposits over 1999-2015 exceeds 50%, decreasing from 70% at the beginning of the 2000s, to 34% in the 
present. 
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as a scale variable. The positive sign of the spread’s coefficient 2ω  implies that   , 
which reflects the low value of  , in agreement with the estimates of equation (20). Third, 
the coefficient 
3ω  is positive, as expected, in all the cases for household consumption and 
with one exception (Romania) for industrial production.22 The consumption and output 
elasticities, however, exceed 1. We, thus, reject the hypothesis of a unitary elasticity.  
If we compare the CEE countries, the Hungarian and Romanian money demand 
responds more to the opportunity cost based on the internal discounted interest rate, while the 
Czech money demand responds more to the opportunity cost spread. In addition, real output 
exhibits greater importance for Czech and Polish money demand compared with Hungarian 
and Romanian money demand. All in all, the small elasticity of substitution may imply less 
monetary integration for CEE countries. 
We check the robustness of these findings, using M1 instead of M2 for the money 
demand in equation (20). Table 4 presents the results. As in the previous case, a string 
correspondences exist between the DOLS and FMOLS estimates. Only for the DOLS 
approach does the Hansen’s (1992) instability test shows the existence of a cointegrating 
relationship for all countries. The FMOLS estimator rejects the null of cointegration in 5 of 
the 8 cases. At the same time, 1ω  exhibits the expected sign and is significant in all cases, 
except Romania, when consumption is the scale variable. The spread of opportunity cost 
( 2ω ) positively affects money demand, indicating that  , with two exceptions, Hungary 
and Poland for the DOLS estimation with household consumption as the scale variable (this 
result does not stand when we use industrial production). A slight difference in results occurs 
for M2 with industrial production. The FMOLS estimate for Poland finds that 3ω  is negative. 
All in all, our empirical estimates fit the theoretical assumptions synthetized in 
equations (15) and (20). The employed tests confirm, in general, the long-run relationship, 
                                                          
22 This result may reflect the fact that real industrial production for Romania is not an I(1) process.  
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explaining the money demand in CEE countries. Consequently, money demand in CEE 
countries depends on the opportunity cost of holding the money (i.e., the discounted money 
market rate), the spread of the opportunity cost, and the scale variable (i.e., consumption or 
output). 
6. Conclusions 
We investigated the money demand in CEE countries starting from a theoretical model with 
micro-foundations, which incorporates both the currency substitution and money demand 
sensitivity to exchange rate effects. This model established a channel for an exchange rate 
effect on money demand, even absent currency substitution. We apply this model to CEE 
countries, where the euro offers liquidity services to domestic agents, while money of CEE 
countries does not offer liquidity service to residents of the euro area. .  
The model parameterization shows that CEE money demand includes two 
complementary cointegrating relationships, which represent an original result of our model. 
The empirical findings revealed by Hansen’s (1992) instability test, on the one hand, and the 
DOLS and FMOLS estimators, on the other hand, document the two cointegrating 
relationships, where real CEE money demand depends on the opportunity cost of holding the 
money as well as real consumption or real output. A consensus exists between the DOLS and 
FMOLS results, and the findings are robust to the use of M2 or M1 for assessing the money 
demand in equation (20). In general, the CEE countries’ agents perceive that domestic 
currency is more liquid than the euro and a low level of substitution exists between domestic 
currencies and the euro. Previous empirical studies on CEE countries’ money demand test the 
money demand sensitivity to international factors and report, in general, a high substitution 
level. Our micro-founded model shows a lower level of substitution and complementarity, not 
substitutability, between CEE currencies and the euro. Therefore, we should view the high 
degree of substitution between CEE currencies and the euro reported in prior studies with 
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caution, because these studies do not consider exchange rate effects on money demand in the 
absence of currency substitution. Also, they do not consider, as possible, complementary 
between CEE currencies and the euro. 
Our empirical results, however, do not represent incontestable proof of two long-run 
money demand relationships, as the results prove less robust for the FMOLS estimator. 
Nevertheless, the empirical findings clearly show a reduced degree of substitution. Thus, the 
monetary integration of CEE countries with the euro area seems lower for the moment. This 
result, however, depends on stronger confidence in the CEE domestic currencies, and by the 
increased liquidity service they provide. Moreover, other criteria such as the adoption of EU 
regulations and the level of financial integration, show that the CEE countries are more and 
more prepared for euro adoption.   
The policy implications of our study are twofold. We show that the monetary 
authorities in the CEE countries should consider, in the money demand estimation, not only 
the opportunity cost of holding the money and consumption or output, but also the effect of 
the exchange rate, which occurs even absent strong currency substitution. At the same time, 
we posit that the degree of substitution between CEE currencies and the euro should not 
imply per se reduced monetary integration. Actual macroeconomic policies increased the 
confidence of CEE agents in domestic currencies. These countries need the political will to 
join the euro zone, even though efforts must continue toward higher monetary integration. 
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Table 1. Unit root tests  
Variables Tests Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania 






*
tt
t
MS
M
ln  
ADF -1.788*** -1.460*** -0.808*** -0.954*** 
PP -1.674*** -1.593*** -0.769*** -0.960*** 
*
1t1t ocln ocln    
ADF -2.669** -1.785*** -1.371*** -2.020*** 
PP -2.661** -2.350*** -1.573*** -2.058*** 






t
t
P
M2
ln  
ADF -0.012*** -1.189***  1.065*** -1.795*** 
PP  0.048*** -1.294***  0.752*** -0.602*** 






t
t
P
M1
ln  
ADF -1.370*** -1.365*** -0.408*** -1.650*** 
PP -1.453*** -1.162*** -0.048*** -0.685*** 
1tocln   ADF -1.181*** -0.367*** -0.852*** -0.552*** 
PP -1.269*** -0.302*** -1.016*** -0.191*** 






t
t
P
XC
ln  
ADF -2.505*** -2.202*** -0.078*** -1.070*** 
PP -2.281*** -2.573*** -0.414*** -1.470*** 






t
t
P
XIP
ln  
ADF -1.604*** -1.396*** -0.463*** -7.620 
PP -3.114* -2.023*** -1.605*** -8.420 
Notes: (i) the null hypothesis is the presence of unit root and *, **, *** means a p-value for the t-statistic 
>1%, >5% and >10% respectively. (ii) 






t
t
P
M1
ln  and 





t
t
P
M2
ln are the two forms of 





t
t
P
M
ln used in 
equation (20), considering the monetary aggregate M2 and M1, while 






t
t
P
XC
ln  and 





t
t
P
XIP
ln  are the two 
forms of 






t
t
P
X
ln  used in equation (20), considering the household consumption expenditure (C) and 
respectively the industrial production index (IP). 
 
Table 2. Cointegration test and estimations for equation (15) 






*
tt
t
MS
M
ln  Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania 
 DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS 
0κ  
 2.20***  2.17***  1.56***  1.43***  1.56***  1.69***  1.21***  0.93*** 
1κ   0.48***  0.38**  0.27***  0.15 -0.37** -0.24  0.52***  0.32*** 
R2  0.30  0.16  0.25  0.06  0.29  0.08  0.74  0.48 
cL statistic  0.00 
(>0.2) 
 1.28 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 0.35 
(0.10) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 1.83 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 0.66 
(0.01) 
Wald t-statistic 
11   
 2.83 
(0.00) 
 3.92 
(0.00) 
 6.00 
(0.00) 
 8.72 
(0.00) 
 7.58 
(0.00) 
 7.36 
(0.00) 
 6.18 
(0.00) 
 10.5 
(0.00) 
Notes: (i) ***, **, * means significance at 1%, 5% et 10% significance level; (ii) p-value in brackets; (iii) 
0κ is the intercept of equation (15); 1κ  is the coefficient of  * 1t1t ocln ocln   , with a negative sign. 
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Table 3. Cointegration test and estimations for equation (20) 






t
t
P
M2
ln  Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania 
Consumption DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS 
0ω  -7.68*** -2.30  1.92* -0.02 -7.92*** -5.65*** -1.44*** -3.80*** 
1ω   0.07*  0.08**  0.23***  0.19*** -0.21*** -0.04  0.20***  0.13*** 
2ω   0.90***  0.23***  0.02  0.10***  0.01  0.05**  0.03*  0.17*** 
3ω   2.45***  1.61***  0.89***  1.11***  2.72***  2.23***  1.39***  1.83*** 
R2  0.98  0.88  0.98  0.80 0.99  0.98  0.99  0.98 
cL statistic  0.00 
(>0.2) 
 1.01 
(0.02) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 0.68 
(0.09) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 2.02 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 0.93 
(0.03) 
Wald t-statistic 
1ω1    
 27.3 
(0.00) 
 21.5 
(0.00) 
 34.2 
(0.00) 
 29.0 
(0.00) 
 24.0 
(0.00) 
 28.6 
(0.00) 
 46.9 
(0.00) 
 32.3 
(0.00) 
Wald t-statistic 
1ω3   
 5.36 
(0.00) 
 2.66 
(0.00) 
 0.95 
(0.34) 
 0.76 
(0.44) 
 11.2 
(0.00) 
 10.1 
(0.00) 
 5.64 
(0.00) 
 10.4 
(0.00) 
Industrial 
production 
DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS 
0ω   9.38***  8.65***  6.60***  9.60***  8.75***  7.56***  2.98***  4.48*** 
1ω   0.08  0.21***  0.79***  0.36*** -0.02  0.19***  0.97***  0.53*** 
2ω   5.93***  0.41***  0.73*** -0.19  0.26***  0.24*** -0.35***  0.10 
3ω   2.14***  1.45***  3.33***  0.68  2.27***  1.68*** -1.14*** -0.46* 
R2  0.95  0.78  0.90  0.45  0.99  0.91  0.98  0.83 
cL statistic  0.00 
(>0.2) 
 0.49 
(>0.2) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 1.66 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 0.50 
(>0.2) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 1.28 
(0.00) 
Wald t-statistic 
1ω3   
 2.05 
(0.04) 
 1.70 
(0.09) 
 3.35 
(0.00) 
 0.60 
(0.58) 
 3.95 
(0.00) 
 3.48 
(0.00) 
 5.87 
(0.00) 
 5.46 
(0.00) 
Notes: (i) ***, **, * means significance at 1%, 5% et 10% significance level; (ii) p-value in brackets; (iii) 
0ω is the intercept of equation (20); (iv) 1ω  is the coefficient of 1tocln   with a negative sign, 2ω  is the 
coefficient of  * 1t1t lnoclnoc    and 3ω  is the coefficients of 





t
t
P
XC
ln  or 





t
t
P
XIP
ln ; (v) M2 aggregate is 
considered. 
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Table 4. Cointegration test and estimations for equation (20) – robustness check based on M1 






t
t
P
M1
ln  Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Romania 
Consumption DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS 
0ω  -12.0*** -11.2***  2.69*** -0.60 -11.3*** -3.80*** -9.50*** -11.8*** 
1ω   0.31***  0.34***  0.50***  0.36***  0.09**  0.13***  0.06  -0.00 
2ω   0.43*  0.15*** -0.08***  0.04 -0.10***  0.17*** -0.00  0.12 
3ω   2.68***  2.55***  0.61***  1.01  2.92***  1.83***  2.82***  3.26*** 
R2  0.99  0.96  0.98  0.87  0.99  0.98  0.99  0.96 
cL statistic  0.00 
(>0.2) 
 0.95 
(0.02) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 0.55 
(0.17) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 0.93 
(0.02) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 0.55 
(0.17) 
Wald t-statistic 
1ω3   
 4.75 
(0.00) 
 7.05 
(0.00) 
 4.14 
(0.00) 
 0.07 
(0.93) 
 12.3 
(0.00) 
 10.4 
(0.00) 
 3.40 
(0.00) 
 9.49 
(0.00) 
Industrial 
production 
DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS 
0ω   6.95***  6.18***  5.23***  8.00***  6.86***  4.48*** -0.62  2.43** 
1ω   0.40***  0.55***  0.96***  0.53***  0.22***  0.53***  1.62***  0.77*** 
2ω   0.77***  0.42***  0.53***  0.17  0.17***  0.10 -0.79*** -0.01 
3ω   3.38***  2.31***  3.04***  0.85*  2.73*** -0.46* -1.66** -0.57 
R2  0.99  0.89  0.96  0.70  0.99 0.83  0.97  0.75 
cL statistic  0.00 
(>0.2) 
 0.58 
(0.15) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 1.61 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 1.28 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(>0.2) 
 0.96 
(0.02) 
Wald t-statistic 
1ω3   
 5.27 
(0.00) 
 4.36 
(0.00) 
 4.63 
(0.00) 
 0.31 
(0.75) 
 8.20 
(0.00) 
 5.46 
(0.00) 
 3.63 
(0.00) 
 3.06 
(0.00) 
Notes: (i) ***, **, * means significance at 1%, 5% et 10% significance level; (ii) p-value in brackets; (iii) 
0ω is the intercept of equation (20); (iv) 1ω  is the coefficient of 1tocln   with a negative sign, 2ω  is the 
coefficient of  * 1t1t lnoclnoc    and 3ω  is the coefficients of 





t
t
P
XC
ln  or 





t
t
P
XIP
ln . 
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Appendix - Data description 
Variables Database Explanations 
M2  
 
IFS (IMF) Monetary aggregate M2 in millions of national currency. As data are not 
available for all the countries over the entire time-span 1999:M1-2015M11, the 
series was completed as follows: OECD statistics for the Czech Republic (1999-
2001) and for Hungary (1999-2004); national bank statistics for Romania (1999-
2001).  
 
M1  IFS (IMF) Monetary aggregate M1 in millions of national currency. As data are not 
available for all the countries over the entire time-span 1999:M1-2015M11, the 
series was completed as follows: OECD statistics for the Czech Republic (1999-
2001); national bank statistics for Romania (1999-2001). 
 
Interest rate IFS (IMF) 
 
The money market rate from the International Financial Statistics. For Hungary 
and the euro area, Eurostat data (day-to-day). 
 
Domestic 
deposits to 
foreign 
deposits ratio 
 
National 
Banks 
For the Czech Republic, banking clients’ deposits in foreign currency to total 
deposits. For Hungary, Poland and Romania, aggregated balance sheet data of 
credit institutions.  
 
Prices IFS (IMF) Consumer Price Index (2010=100). 
 
Consumption IFS (IMF) Household consumption expenditure (quarterly data transformed in monthly data 
using a cubic spline function). 
 
Output IFS (IMF) Industrial Production index (2010=100). 
 
